GIFT   OF 


THE  CASE  OV 
BELGIUM 

In  the  Light  of  Official  Reports  found  in  the  Secret 

Archives  of  the  Belgian  Government 

after  the  Occupation  of  Brussels 


WITH    FACSIMILES    OF    THE    DOCUMENTS 


The  Case  of  Belgium 

In  the  Light  of  Official  Reports  Found  in  the 
Secret  Archives  of   the  Belgian   Govern 
ment  after  the  Occupation  of  Brussels 


REMARKS  INTRODUCTORY  TO  THE  SECRET 

DOCUMENTS 
By  Dr.  Bernhard  Dernburg 

HEREWITH  are  published  facsimiles  of  papers 
found  among  the  documents  of  the  Belgian  Gen 
eral  Staff  at  Brussels,  referring  to  arrangements  between 
the  English  Military  Attache  and  the  Belgian  Minister  of 
War  regarding  British  intervention  in  Belgium. 

It  will  be  remembered  from  the  British  White  Book 
that  in  November,  1912,  a  correspondence  passed  be 
tween  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  the  French  Minister  in 
London,  in  which  it  was  stated  that  British  and  French 
military  and  naval  experts  had  consulted  together  from 
time  to  time  as  to  plans  to  be  followed  in  case  of  war, 
and  it  was  stated  in  this  correspondence  that  in  accord 
ance  with  such  prearranged  plans  the  French  fleet  would 
stay  in  the  Mediterranean  to  safeguard  the  joint  interests 
there,  whereas  the  British  fleet  would  safeguard  their 
interests  in  the  north.  Of  this  correspondence  the  mem 
bers  of  the  British  Cabinet  remained  ignorant  until  the 
Cabinet  meeting  immediately  preceding  the  written  state 
ment  by  Great  Britain  on  August  2  that  in  case  a  Ger 
man  fleet  attacked  the  French  coast  or  passed  into  the 
channel,  England  would  give  all  the  assistance  in  her 
power  (British  White  Papers  No.  148),  and  it  was  also, 
of  course,  concealed  from  the  British  public  until  the 
speech  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  August  3.  It  will  be 
remembered  that  in  consequence  of  this  revelation  the 
British  Minister  of  Commerce,  Mr.  John  Burns,  and  two 
other  members,  Lord  Morley  and  Mr.  Trevelyan,  left 
the  British  Cabinet  under  protest ;  that  the  leader  of  the 
British  Labor  Party,  Mr.  Ramsey  McDonald,  resigned 
from  the  leadership  and  that  Mr.  Arthur  Ponsonby  in 
his  famous  letter  denounced  Sir  Edward  Grey's  practices. 

Mr.  Ponsonby  said  that  time  and  again  they  had  been 
assured  that  there  were  no  obligations  whatsoever  on  the 
part  of  Great  Britain  to  come  to  France's  assistance  and 
yet  they  found  themselves  now  so  hopelessly  entangled 
that  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  British  Government  could  not 
back  out. 

The  fact  of  these  consultations,  by  which,  of  course, 
all  the  plans  of  mobilization  of  both  the  British  and 
French  armies  were  disclosed  to  the  two  allies  and  which 


include  the  landing  of  English  troops  in  France,  is  now 
fully  established  by  the  annexed  documents.  They  show 
that  these  conversations  were  also  held  with  Belgium, 
that  plans  had  been  concerted  to  invade  Belgium  with 
an  army  of  100.000  men  by  way  of  three  French  ports — 
viz.,  Dunkirk,  Calais  and  Boulogne — and  that  the  British 
plans  even  considered  a  landing  by  way  of  the  Scheldt, 
thus  violating  also  Dutch  neutrality. 

The  documents,  giving  all  the  details  as  translated  and 
showing  that  Belgian  railway  cars  were  to  be  sent  to  the 
named  French  ports  in  order  to  transport  the  British 
troops  into  Belgium,  are  dated  from  1906. 

The  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  Baron  Greindl,  a  well 
known  Belgian  patriot,  protested  to  his  government. 
The  heading  of  his  protest  is  also  given  in  facsimile.  In 
it  he  said  that  it  was  not  quite  safe  to  trust  to  the  British 
and  French  to  keep  the  Belgian  neutrality,  that  it  was 
not  wise  to  take  all  measures  only  against  a  German 
infraction  of  Belgian  neutrality  and  that  the  British 
spirit  was  clearly  shown  by  the  words  of  Colonel 
Barnardiston  that  the  Scheldt  might  be  used  for  trans 
porting  troops  into  Belgium. 

Furthermore,  it  will  be  remembered  that  the  British 
and  French  Governments  violently  protested  when  the 
plans  were  made  public  that  the  Dutch  Government 
intended  to  fortify  the  mouth  of  the  Scheldt  in  1906. 
But  in  1912,  when  the  Balkan  crisis  became  acute,  the 
British  went  one  step  further.  When  Colonel  Bridges, 
in  a  conversation  with  General  Jungbluth,  the  chief  of 
the  Belgian  general  staff,  said  that  England  was  ready 
to  strike,  that  160,000  men  were  ready  to  be  landed  and 
that  they  would  land  them  as  soon  as  any  European 
conflict  should  break  out,  General  Jungbluth  protested 
that  for  such  a  step  the  permission  of  Belgium  was 
necessary.  The  cool  reply  was  that  the  English  knew 
it,  but  thought  that,  as  Belgium  was  not  strong  enough 
alone  to  protect  herself,  England  would  land  troops  any 
way.  General  Jungbluth  answered  that  Belgium  felt 
strong  enough  to  protect  herself,  which  is  in  keeping 
with  her  declaration  to  France,  when  she  offered  to  pro 
tect  Belgium  by  five  army  corps,  as  reported  in  the 
British  White  Book.  The  position  of  England  was 
therefore  that,  while  in  1906  they  had  already  concerted 


THE    CASE    OF    BELGIUM 


plans  for  a  joint  action,  in  1912  England  intended  action 
in  any  case,  should  a  European  conflagration  break  out. 

Now,  it  must  be  recollected  that  as  early  as  July  28, 
1914,  Sir  Edward  Grey  said  to  Prince  Lichnowsky,  as 
mentioned  in  his  communication  to  Sir  E.  Goschen : 
"The  situation  was  very  grave.  While  it  was  restricted 
to  the  issues  at  present  actually  involved,  we  had  not 
thought  of  interfering  in  it.  But  if  Germany  became 
involved  in  it  and  then  France,  the  issue  might  be  so 
great  that  it  would  involve  all  European  interests,  and  I 
did  not  wish  him  to  be  misled  by  the  friendly  tone  of  our 
conversation — which  I  hoped  would  continue — into 
thinking  that  we  should  stand  aside."  (British  White 
Papers,  No.  89.) 

This  was  at  a  time  when  the  Belgian  issue  had  not 
been  raised  at  all.  It  only  came  about  by  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  notes  written  on  July  31.  Thus  the  British 
entanglement  with  France,  as  evidenced  by  the  British 
White  Book,  prevented  England  taking  the  same  attitude 
in  1914  which  she  had  taken  in  1870,  when  she  made  a 
treaty  with  France  as  against  the  German  invasion  of 
Belgium  and  with  Germany  as  against  the  French  inva 
sion  of  Belgium.  A  similar  agreement  was  suggested  by 
Prince  Lichnowsky  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  August  1, 
1914,  as  reported  in  the  English  \Vhite  Book,  No.  123, 
when  the  former  asked  Sir  Edward  Grey  whether  if 
Germany  gave  a  promise  not  to  violate  Belgian  neutrality 
England  would  engage  to  remain  neutral,  upon  which 
Grey  replied  that  he  could  not  say  that. 

It  is  therefore  perfectly  evident,  in  the  first  place,  that 
in  case  of  a  German  war  that  was  sure  to  be  brought 
about  by  Russia's  mobilization  against  Germany,  Eng 
land  would  go  to  war  against  Germany,  and  it  has  been 
proved  that  the  English  assurance  to  that  effect  has 
strengthened  the  hands  of  the  Russian  war  party,  which 
thereupon  got  the  upper  hand  and  forced  the  Russian 
Czar  into  the  war  (see  report  of  Belgian  Charge 
d'Affaires  at  St.  Petersburg  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  at  Brussels  July  30). 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  shown  that  England  meant, 
with  or  without  Belgium's  will,  to  land  her  troops,  in 
violation  of  Belgium's  neutrality,  in  Belgium,  irrespective 
of  whether  German  troops  were  marching  through  Bel 
gium  or  not,  because  no  such  declaration  had  been  made 
in  1912  or  any  time  thereafter  until  August  4  in  the 
German  Reichstag.  It  is  further  evident  that  as  soon 
as  Russia  mobilized,  Germany  would  have  to  fight  Russia 
as  well  as  France  and  England  and  that  in  such  a  fight 
she  was  forced  to  draw  quickly  when  she  saw  her 
enemies  reaching  for  their  hip  pockets.  And  only  the 
prompt  action  at  Liege  that  put  this  important  railway 
center  commanding  the  railway  connections  to  France 
and  Germany  into  German  hands  prevented  the  English 
landing  and  invading  Belgium. 

The  guilt  of  the  Belgian  Government  in  this  matter 
consists,  in  the  first  place,  in  making  and  concerting  plans 
with  the  English  and  French  Governments  as  to  what 


steps  to  take  in  case  of  war.  A  plan  of  the  French 
mobilization  was  found  in  the  same  docket,  and  it  can 
not  be  presumed  that  the  conference  between  British 
and  French  experts  was  unknown  to  the  British  Military 
Attache  in  Brussels.  It  is  furthermore  impossible  to 
believe  that  the  French  railway  for  the  shipping  of 
British  troops  from  Calais,  Dunkirk  and  Boulogne  into 
Belgium  in  Belgian  cars  could  have  been  used  without 
the  knowledge  of  the  French  authorities.  Secondly,  that 
Belgium  did  not  heed  the  advice  of  Baron  Greindl  and 
did  not  try  to  insure  her  independence  in  the  same  way 
by  approaching  Germany  and  making  a  similar  contract 
with  her.  This  disposes  of  the  contention  that  the  Bel 
gian  conversation  had  a  purely  defensive  character  as 
against  all  comers.  It  shows  the  one-sidedness  of  the 
inclination,  which,  is  evidenced  also  by  the  placing  of  all 
Belgium's  fortresses  on  the  eastern  frontier. 

The  Belgian  people  had  been  told  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war  that  Germany  demanded  that  the  Belgian  forces 
should  fight  with  the  Germans  against  the  French  and 
the  English,  and  the  truth  had  become  known  only  three 
full  months  later,  when  the  Belgian  Gray  Book  was 
published.  Then  Belgium  was  practically  occupied  ter 
ritory.  While  Belgium  pretended  neutrality  and  friend 
ship  toward  Germany,  it  was  secretly  planning  for  her 
defeat  in  a  war  which  was  considered  unavoidable.  The 
poor  Belgian  people,  however,  must  suffer  because  of  the 
large  ambitions  of  King  Leopold  of  Congo  fame  and  of 
a  broken  down  diplomacy. 

The  Imperial  Chancellor  has  declared  that  there  was 
irrefutable  proof  that  if  Germany  did  not  march  through 
Belgium,  her  enemies  would.  This  proof,  as  now  being 
produced,  is  of  the  strongest  character.  So  the  Chan 
cellor  was  right  in  appealing  to  the  law  of  necessity, 
although  he  had  to  regret  that  it  violated  international 
law.  This  law  of  necessity  has  been  recognized  as  para 
mount  by  nearly  every  prominent  statesman,  including 
(iladstone,  and  by  all  teachers  of  international  law,  even 
by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court's  decision,  volume 
130,  page  601,  stating  in  regard  to  the  treaty  with  China 
concerning  Chinese  immigration  into  the  United  States : 
"It  will  not  be  presumed  that  the  legislative  department 
of  the  Government  will  lightly  pass  laws  which  are  in 
conflict  with  the  treaties  of  the  country,  but  that  circum 
stances  may  arise  which  would  not  only  justify  the 
Government  in  disregarding  their  stipulations,  but  de 
mand  in  the  interests  of  the  country  that  it  should  do  so, 
there  can  be  no  question.  Unexpected  events  may  call 
for  a  change  in  the  policy  of  the  country."  And  to 
strengthen  this  opinion  another  decision  by  Justice  Cur 
tis,  rendered  in  1908,  may  be  cited,  stating  that,  "while 
it  would  be  a  matter  of  the  utmost  gravity  and  delicacy 
to  refuse  to  execute  a  treaty,  the  power  to  do  so  was  a 
prerogative  of  which  no  country  could  be  deprived 
without  deeply  affecting  its  independence." 

We  now  let  these  Belgian  documents  speak  for  them 
selves. 


AND    THE    SECRET    DOCUMENTS 


SUMMARY  OF  THE  SECRET  DOCUMENTS 


I.  The  first  document  is  a  report  of  the  Chief  of  the 
Belgian  General  Staff,  Major-General  Ducarme,  to  the 
Minister  of  War,  reporting  a  series  of   conversations 
which  he  had  had  with  the  Military  Attache  of  the  British 
Legation,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston,  in  Brussels. 
It  discloses  that,  as  early  as  January,  1906,  the  Belgian 
Government  was  in  consultation  with  the  British  Gov 
ernment  over  steps  to  be  taken  by  Belgium,  Great  Britain 
and  France  against  Germany.     A  plan  had  been  fully 
elaborated  for  the  landing  of  two  British  army  corps  in 
French  ports  to  be  transferred  to  the  point  in  Belgium 
necessary  for  operations  against  the  Germans.    Through 
out  the  conversation  the  British  and  Belgian  forces  were 
spoken    of    as    "allied    armies" ;    the    British    Military 
Attache  insisted  on  discussing  the  question  of  the  chief 
command ;  and  he  urged  the  establishment,  in  the  mean 
time,  of  a  Belgian  spy  system  in  Germany. 

II.  When     in     the    year     1912     Lieuteriant-Colonel 
Barnardiston  had  been  succeeded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Bridges  as  British  Military  Attache  in  Brussels,  and  the 
Chief    of    the    Belgian    General    Staff,    Major-General 
Ducarme,  had  been  succeeded  by  General  Jungbluth  as 
Chief  of  the  Belgian  General  Staff,  the  conversations 
proceeded  between  the  two  latter  officials.     That  is  to 
say,  these  were  not  casual  conversations  between  indi 
viduals,  but  a  series  of  official   conversations  between 
representatives  of  their  respective  governments,  in  pur 
suance  of  a  well-considered  policy  on  the  part  of  both 
governments. 


III.  The  above  documents  are  given  additional  sig 
nificance  by  a  report  made  in  1911  by  Baron  Greindl, 
Belgian  Minister  in  Berlin  to  the  Belgian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  from  which  it  appears  that  this  represen 
tative  of  the  Belgian  Government  in  Berlin  was  familiar 
with  the  plans  above  set  forth  and  protested  against  them, 
asking  why  like  preparations  had  not  been  made  with 
Germany  to  repel  invasion  by  the  French  and  English. 

Taken  together,  these  documents  show  that  the  British 
Government  had  the  intention,  in  case  of  a  Franco- 
German  war,  of  sending  troops  into  Belgium  imme 
diately — that  is,  of  doing  the  very  thing  which,  done  by 
Germany,  was  used  by  England  as  a  pretext  for  declaring 
war  on  Germany. 

They  show  also  that  the  Belgian  Government  took,  in 
agreement  with  the  English  General  Staff,  military 
precautions  against  a  hypothetical  German  invasion  of 
Belgium.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Belgian  Government 
never  made  the  slightest  attempt  to  take,  in  agreement 
with  the  German  Government,  military  precautions 
against  an  Anglo-French  invasion  of  Belgium,  though 
fully  informed  that  it  was  the  purpose  of  the  British 
Government  to  land  and  dispatch,  across  French  terri 
tory  into  Belgium,  160,000  troops,  without  asking  Bel 
gium's  permission,  on  the  first  outbreak  of  the  European 
war.  This  clearly  demonstrates  that  the  Belgian  Govern 
ment  was  determined  from  the  outset  to  join  Germany's 
enemies. 


[Inscription  on  the  cover  of  General  Ducarme's  Report] 


THE   CASE   OF   BELGIUM 

DOCUMENT  NO.  1 

Report  of  General  Ducarme,  Chief  of  the  Belgian  General  Staff,  to  the  Belgian  Minister  of  War 


"Confidential 

"Letter  to  the  Minister 
"Concerning  the  Confidential  Conversations 


'Brussels,  April  10,  1906. 


"Mr.  Minister: 


"I  have  the  honor  to  report  to  you  briefly  about  the 
conversations  which  I  had  with  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Barnardiston  and  which  have  already  been  the  subject  of 
my  oral  communications. 

"The  first  visit  took  place  in  the  middle  of  January. 
Mr.  Barnardiston  referred  to  the  anxieties  of  the  General 
Staff  of  his  country  with  regard  to  the  general  political 
situation,  and  because  of  the  possibility  that  war  may 
soon  break  out.  In  case  Belgium  should  be  attacked,  the 
sending  of  about  100,000  troops  was  provided  for. 

"The  Lieutenant-Colonel  asked  me  how  such  a  meas 
ure  would  be  regarded  by  us.  I  answered  him,  that  from 
a  military  point  of  view  it  could  not  be  but  favorable, 
but  that  this  question  of  intervention  was  just  as  much 
a  matter  for  the  political  authorities,  and  that,  therefore, 
it  was  my  duty  to  inform  the  Minister  of  War  about  it. 

"Mr.  Barnardiston  answered  that  his  Minister  in 
Brussels  would  speak  about  it  with  our  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs. 

"He  proceeded  in  the  following  sense :  The  landing 
of  the  English  troops  would  take  place  at  the  French 
coast  in  the  vicinity  of  Dunkirk  and  Calais,  so  as  to 
hasten  their  movements  as  much  as  possible.  The  entry 
of  the  English  into  Belgium  would  take  place  only  after 
the  violation  of  our  neutrality  by  Germany.  A  landing 
in  Antwerp  would  take  much  more  time,  because  larger 
transports  would  be  needed,  and  because  on  the  other 
hand  the  safety  would  be  less  complete. 

"This  admitted,  there  would  be  several  other  points 
to  consider,  such  as  railway  transportation,  the  question 
of  requisitions  which  the  English  army  could  make,  the 
question  concerning  the  chief  command  of  the  allied 
forces. 

"He  inquired  whether  our  preparations  were  sufficient 
to  secure  the  defense  of  the  country  during  the  crossing 
and  the  transportation  of  the  English  troops — which  he 
estimated  to  last  about  ten  days. 

"I  answered  him  that  the  places  Namur  and  Liege 
were  protected  from  a  "coup  de  main"  and  that  our  field 
army  of  100,000  men  would  be  capable  of  intervention 
within  four  days. 

"After  having  expressed  his  full  satisfaction  with  my 
explanations,  my  visitor  laid  emphasis  on  the  following 
facts:  (1 )  that  our  conversation  was  entirely  confiden 
tial;  (2)  that  it  was  not  binding  on  his  government; 
(.1)  that  his  Minister,  the  English  General  Staff,  he  and 


Confident  idle. 

Lettre  a  Monsieur  le  Ministre 
au  sujet  des  entretiens  confidentiels. 


Bruxelles,  le  10  avril  1906. 


Monsieur  le  Alinistre, 


J'ai  1'honneur  de  vous  rendre  compte  sommairement 
des  entretiens  que  j'ai  eus  avec  le  Lieutenant  Colonel 
liarnardiston  et  qui  ont  fait  1'objet  de  mes  communica 
tions  verbales. 

La  premiere  visite  date  de  la  mi-janvier.  Monsieur 
Barnardiston  me  fit  part  des  preoccupations  de  1'etat- 
major  de  son  pays  relativement  a  la  situation  politique 
generate  et  aux  eventual  ites  de  guerre  du  moment.  Un 
envoi  de  troupes,  d'un  total  de  100,000  hommes  environ, 
etait  projete  pour  le  cas  ou  la  Belgique  serait  attaquee. 

Le  Lieutenant  Colonel  m'ayant  demande  comment 
cette  action  serait  interpreted  par  nous,  je  lui  repondis 
que,  au  point  de  vue  militaire,  elle  ne  pourrait  qu'etre 
favorable;  mais  que  cette  question  d'intervention  relevait 
cgalement  du  pouvoir  politique  et  que,  des  lors,  j'etais 
tenu  d'en  entretenir  le  Ministre  de  la  guerre. 

Monsieur  Barnardiston  me  repondit  que  son  ministre 
a  Bruxelles  en  parlerait  a  notre  Ministre  des  affaires 
etrangeres. 

II  continua  dans  ce  sens :  Le  debarquement  des  troupes 
anglaises  se  ferait  sur  la  cote  de  France,  vers  Dunkerque 
et  Calais,  de  fac,on  a  hater  le  plus  possible  le  mouvement. 
(L'entree  des  Anglais  en  Belgique  ne  se  ferait  qu'apres 
la  violation  de  notre  neutralite  par  1'Allemagne.)  Le 
debarquement  par  Anvers  demanderait  beaucoup  plus 
de  temps  parcequ'il  faudrait  des  transports  plus  con 
siderables  et,  d'autre  part,  la  securite  serait  moins  com 
plete. 

Ceci  admis,  il  resterait  a  regler  divers  autres  points, 
savoir :  les  transports  par  chemin  de  f er,  la  question  des 
requisitions  auxquelles  1'armee  anglaise  pourrait  avoir 
recours,  la  question  du  commandement  superieur  des 
forces  alliees. 

II  s'informa  si  nos  dispositions  etaient  suffisantes  pour 
assurer  la  defense  du  pays  durant  la  traversee  et  les 
transports  des  troupes  anglaises,  temps  qu'il  evaluait  a 
une  dizaine  de  jours. 

Je  repondis  que  les-places  de  Namur  et  de  Liege 
t'taient  a  1'abri  d'un  coup  de  main  et  que,  en  4  jours, 
notre  armee  de  campagne,  forte  cle  100,000  hommes, 
serait  en  etat  d'intervenir. 

Aprcs  avoir  cxprime  toute  sa  satisfaction  au  sujet  dc 
mes  declarations,  mon  interlocuteur  insista  sur  le  fait 
que  1°)  notre  conversation  etait  absolument  confiden- 
tiellc;  2°)  elle  ne  pouvait  her  son  gouvernement ;  3°) 
son  Ministre,  1'Etat-Major  General  anglais,  lui  et  moi 


AND    THE    SECRET    DOCUMENTS 


DOCUMENT  NO.  1 


*.  ^ 


6 


THE   CASE   OF   BELGIUM 


I  were,  up  to  the  present,  the  only  ones*  informed  about 
the  matter ;  (4)  that  he  did  not  know  whether  the  opinion 
of  his  Sovereign  has  been  consulted. 


etions  seuls,  en  ce  moment,  dans  la  confidence;  4°)  il 
ignorait  si  son  souverain  avait  etc  pressenti. 


"In  a  following  discussion  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bar- 
nardiston  assured  me  that  he  had  never  received  confi 
dential  reports  of  the  other  military  attaches  about  our 
army.  He  then  gave  the  exact  numerical  data  of  the 
English  forces;  we  could  depend  on  it,  that  in  12  or  13 
days  2  army  corps,  4  cavalry  brigades  and  2  brigades 
of  horse  infantry  would  be  landed. 

"He  asked  me  to  study  the  question  of  the  transport 
of  these  forces  to  that  part  of  the  country  where  they 
would  be  useful,  and  he  promised  to  give  me  for  this  pur 
pose  details  about  the  composition  of  the  landing  army. 


Dans  un  entretien  subsequant,  le  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Barnardiston  m'assura  qu'il  n'avait  jamais  rec.u  de  con 
fidences  d'autres  attaches  militaires  au  sujet  de  notre 
armee.  II  precisa  ensuite  les  donnees  numerique  con- 
cernant  les  forces  anglaises ;  nous  pouvions  compter  que, 
en  12  ou  13  jours,  seraient  debarques:  2  corps  d'armee, 
4  brigades  de  cavallerie  et  2  brigades  d'infanterie  montee. 

II  me  demanda  d'examiner  la  question  du  transport 
de  ces  forces  vers  la  partie  du  pays  ou  elles  seraient 
utiles  et,  dans  ce  but,  il  me  promit  la  composition  de- 
taillee  de  1'armee  de  debarquement. 


"He  reverted  to  the  question  concerning  the  effective 
strength  of  our  field  army,  and  he  emphasized  that  no 

detachments  should  be  sent  from  this  army  to  Namur  ^^^^^.^..^  ^  ^..^  .„„„.,,  .. 
and  Liege,  because  these  places  were  provided  with  ces  places  etaient  pourvues 
garrisons  of  sufficient  strength. 


II  revint  sur  la  question  des  effectifs  de  notre  armee 
de  campagne  en  insistant  pour  qu'on  ne  fit  pas  de  de- 
tachements  de  cette  armee  a  Namur  et  a  Liege,  puisque 
ces  places  etaient  pourvues  de  garnisons  suffisantes. 


"He  asked  me  to  direct  my  attention  to  the  necessity  of 
granting  the  English  army  the  advantages  which  the  reg 
ulations  concerning  the  military  requisitions  provided 
for.  Finally  he  insisted  upon  the  question  of  the  chief 
command. 

"I  answered  him  that  I  could  say  nothing  with  refer 
ence  to  this  last  point  and  promised  him  that  I  would 
study  the  other  questions  carefully. 


II  me  demanda  de  fixer  mon  attention  sur  la  necessite 
de  permettre  a  1'armee  anglaise  de  beneficier  des  avan- 
tages  prevus  par  le  Reglement  sur  les  prestations  mili 
taires.  Enfin  il  insista  sur  la  question  du  commandement 
supreme. 

Je  lui  repondis  que  je  ne  pouvais  rien  dire  quant  a 
ce  dernier  point,  et  je  lui  promis  un  examen  attentif  des 
autres  questions. 


"Later  on  the  English  Military  Attache  confirmed  his 
former  calculations:  12  days  would  at  least  be  necessary 
to  carry  out  the  landing  at  the  French  coast.  It  would 
take  a  considerably  longer  time  (1  to  2]/2  months)  to 
land  100,000  men  in  Antwerp. 

"Upon  my  objection  that  it  would  be  unnecessary  to 
await  the  end  of  the  landing  in  order  to  begin  with  the 
railway  transportations,  and  that  it  would  be  better  to 
proceed  with  these,  as  when  the  troops  arrived  at  the 
coast,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston  promised  to  give 
me  exact  data  as  to  the  number  of  troops  that  could  be 
landed  daily. 

"As  regards  the  military  requisitions,  I  told  my  visitor 
that  this  question  could  be  easily  regulated. 

*     *     * 

"The  further  the  plans  of  the  English  General  Staff 
progressed,  the  clearer  became  the  details  of  the  prob 
lem.  The  Colonel  assured  me  that  one-half  of  the  Eng 
lish  army  could  be  landed  within  8  days ;  the  rest  at  the 
conclusion  of  the  12th  or  13th  day,  with  the  exception 
of  the  Horse  Infantry,  which  could  not  be  counted  upon 
until  later. 

"In  spite  of  this  I  thought  I  had  to  insist  again  upon 
the  necessity  of  knowing  the  exact  number  of  the  daily 
shipments,  in  order  to  regulate  the  railway  transportation 
for  every  day. 


Plus  tard,  1'attache  militaire  anglais  confirma  son  esti 
mation  precedente:  12  jours  seraient  au  moins  indis- 
pensables  pour  faire  le  debarquement  sur  la  cote  de 
France.  II  faudrait  beaucoup  plus  (la  2^  mois)  pour 
debarquer  100,000  hommes  a  Anvers. 

Sur  mon  objection  qu'il  etait  inutile  d'attendre  1'a- 
chevement  du  debarquement  pour  commencer  les  trans 
ports  par  chemin  de  fer  et  qu'il  valait  mieux  les  faire 
au  fur  et  a  mesure  des  arrivages  a  la  cote,  le  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Barnardiston  me  promit  des  donnees  exactes  sur 
1'etat  journalier  du  debarquement. 

Quant  aux  prestations  militaires,  je  fis  part  a  mon  in- 
terlocuteur  que  cette  question  serait  facilement  reglee. 

*     *     * 

A  mesure  que  les  etudes  de  l'etat-major  anglais  avan- 
c.aient,  les  donnees  du  probleme  se  precisaient.  Le  Col 
onel  m'assura  que  la  moitie  de  1'armee  anglaise  pourrait 
etre  debarquee  en  8  jours,  et  que  le  restant  le  serait  a  la 
fin  du  12e  ou  13e  jour,  sauf  1'infanterie  montee  sur 
laquelle  il  ne  fallait  compter  que  plus  tard, 

Neanmoins,  je  crus  devoir  insister  a  nouveau  sur  la 
necessite  de  connaitre  le  rendement  journalier,  de  faqon 
a  regler  les  transports  par  chemin  de  fer  de  chaque  jour. 


*This  is  similar  to  the  manner  in  which  the  English  Entente 
with  France  was  arranged.  The  British  Parliament  and  the  Brit 
ish  Cabinet  were  kept  in  igorance  of  the  fact  that  English  and 
French  Naval  experts  were  consulting  together.  The  British 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  repeatedly  as 
sured  the  country  that  Great  Britain's  hands  were  free.  Yet 


when  the  crisis  came,  this  quite  unofficial  exchange  of  military 
views  and  plans,  this  mere  gentleman's  agreement,  revealed  itself, 
of  course,  as  a  binding  obligation.  Nations  do  not  reveal  their 
military  secrets  to  each  other  except  on  the  clear  understanding 
that  an  alliance  is  in  force. 


AND    THE    SECRET    DOCUMENTS 


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8 


THE   CASE   OF   BELGIUM 


"The  English  Military  Attache  conversed  with  me 
about  several  other  questions,  namely : 

"(1)  The  necessity  of  keeping  the  operations  secret 
and  of  demanding  strict  secrecy  from  the  Press ; 

"(2)  The  advantages,  which  would  accrue  from  giving 
one  Belgian  officer  to  each  English  General  Staff,  one 
interpreter  to  each  commanding  officer,  and  gendarmes 
to  each  unit  of  troops,  in  order  to  assist  the  British  police 
troops. 

*  *     * 

"In  the  course  of  another  interview  Lieutenant-Col 
onel  Barnardiston  and  I  studied  the  combined  operations 
to  take  place  in  the  event  of  a  German  offensive  with 
Antwerp  as  its  object  and  under  the  hypothesis  of  the 
German  troops  marching  through  our  country  in  order 
to  reach  the  French  Ardennes. 

"In  this  question,  the  Colonel  said  he  quite  agreed 
with  the  plan  which  I  had  submitted  to  him,  and  he  as 
sured  me  also  of  the  approval  of  General  Grierson, 
Chief  of  the  English  General  Staff. 

"Other  secondary  questions  which  were  likewise  set 
tled,  had  particular  reference  to  intermediary  officers, 
interpreters,  gendarmes,  maps,  photographs  of  the  uni 
forms,  special  copies,  translated  into  English,  of  some 
Belgian  regulations,  the  regulations  concerning  the  im 
port  duties  on  English  provisions,  to  the  accommodation 
of  the  wounded  of  the  allied  armies,  etc.  Nothing  was 
resolved  on  as  regards  the  activity  which  the  Govern 
ment  or  the  Military  authorities  might  exert  on  the 
Press. 

*  *    * 

"During  the  final  meetings  which  I  had  with  the 
British  Attache,  he  informed  me  about  the  numbers  of 
troops  which  would  be  daily  disembarked  at  Boulogne, 
Calais  and  Cherbourg.  The  distance  of  the  last  place, 
which  is  necessary  for  technical  considerations,  will  in 
volve  a  certain  delay.  The  first  Corps  would  be  disem 
barked  on  the  10th  day,  and  the  second  on  the  15th  day. 
Our  railways  would  carry  out  the  transportation  so  that 
the  arrival  of  the  first  Corps,  either  in  the  direction  of 
Brussels-Louvain  or  of  Namur-Dinant,  would  be  assured 
on  the  llth  day,  and  that  of  the  second  on  the  16th  day. 

"I  again,  for  a  last  time,  and  as  emphatically  as  I  could, 
insisted  on  the  necessity  of  hastening  the  sea-trans 
ports  so  that  the  English  troops  could  be  with  us  be 
tween  the  llth  and  12th  day.  The  happiest  and  most 
favorable  results  can  be  reached  by  a  convergent  and 
simultaneous  action  of  the  allied  forces.  But  if  mat 
co-operation  should  not  take  place,  the  failure  would 
be  most  serious.  Colonel  Barnardiston  assured  me  that 
everything  serving  to  this  end  would  be  done. 

*  *    * 

"In  the  course  of  our  conversations,  I  had  occasion 
to  convince  the  British  Military  Attache  that  we  were 
willing,  so  far  as  possible,  to  thwart  the  movements  of 
the  enemy  and  not  to  take  refuge  in  Antwerp  from  the 
beginning. 

"Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston  on  his  part  told  me 
that,  at  the  time,  he  had  little  hope  for  any  support  or 
intervention  on  the  part  of  Holland.  At  the  same  time 
he  informed  me  that  his  Government  intended  to  transfer 


L'attache  anglais  m'entretint  ensuite  de  diverses  autres 
questions,  savoir: 

1°)  necessite  de  tenir  le  secret  des  operations  et  d'ob- 
tenir  de  la  presse  qu'elle  1'observat  soigneusement ; 

2°)  avantages  qu'il  y  aurait  a  adjoindre  un  officier 
beige  a  chaque  etat-major  anglais,  un  traducteur  a  chaque 
commandant  de  troupes,  des  gendarmes  a  chaque  unite 
pour  aider  les  troupes  de  police  anglaises. 

*  *     * 

Dans  une  autre  entrevue,  le  Lieutenant  Colonel  Bar 
nardiston  et  moi  examinames  les  operations  combinees 
dans  le  cas  d'une  agression  de  la  part  de  1'Allemagnc 
ayant  comme  objectif  Anvers  et  dans  1'hypothese  d'une 
traversee  de  notre  pays  pour  atteindre  les  Ardennes 
franchises. 

Par  la  suite  le  Colonel  me  marqua  son  accord  sur  le 
plan  que  je  lui  avais  presente  et  m'assura  de  1'assenti- 
ment  du  General  Grierson,  chef  de  1'Etat-Major  anglais. 

D'autres  questions  secondaires  furent  egalement  reg- 
lees,  notamment  en  ce  qui  regarde  les  officiers  inter- 
mediaires,  les  traducteurs,  les  gendarmes,  les  cartes,  les 
albums  des  uniforms,  les  tires  a  part  traduits  en  anglais 
de  certains  reglements  beiges,  le  reglement  des  frais  de 
douane  pour  les  approvisionnements  anglais,  1'hospita- 
lisation  des  blesses  de  1'armee  alliee,  etc.  Rien  ne  fut 
arrete  quant  a  1'action  que  pourrait  exercer  sur  la  presse 
le  gouvernement  ou  1'autorite  militaire. 

*  *     * 

Dans  les  dernieres  rencontres  que  j'ai  cues  avec 
1'attache  anglais,  il  me  communiqua  le  rendement  jour- 
nalier  des  debarquements  a  Boulogne,  Calais  et  Cher 
bourg.  L'eloignement  de  ce  dernier  point,  impose  par 
des  considerations  d'ordre  technique,  occasionne  un 
certain  retard.  Le  ler  Corps  serait  debarque  le  lOe  jour, 
et  le  2e  Corps  le  15e  jour.  Notre  materiel  des  chemins 
de  fer  executerait  les  transports,  de  sorte  que  1'arrivee, 
soit  vers  Bruxelles-Louvain,  soit  vers  Namur-Dinant,  du 
ler  Corps  serait  assuree  le  lie  jour,  et  celle  du  2e  Corps, 
le  16e  jour. 

J'ai  insiste  une  derniere  fois  et  aussi  energiquement 
que  je  le  pouvais,  sur  la  necessite  de  hater  encore  les 
transports  maritimes  de  facon  que  les  troupes  anglaises 
furent  pres  de  nous  entre  le  lie  et  le  12e  jour;  les  resul- 
tats  les  plus  heureux,  les  plus  favorables  peuvent  etre 
obtenus  par  une  action  convergente  et  simultanee  des 
forces  alliees.  Au  contraire,  ce  sera  un  echec  grave  si 
cet  accord  ne  se  produit  pas.  Le  Colonel  Barnardiston 
m'a  assure  que  tout  serait  fait  dans  ce  but. 

*  *     * 

Au  cours  de  nos  entretiens,  j'eu  1'occasion  de  con- 
vaincre  1'attache  militaire  anglais  de  la  volonte  que  nous 
avions  d'entraver,  dans  la  limite  du  possible,  les  mouve- 
ments  de  1'ennemi  et  de  ne  pas  nous  refugier,  des  le 
debut,  dans  Anvers. 

De  son  cote,  le  Lieutenant  Colonel  Barnardiston  me 
fit  part  de  son  peu  de  confiance  actuellernent  dans  1'appui 
ou  1'intervention  de  la  Hollande.  II  me  confia  egalement 
que  son  gouvernement  projetait  de  transporter  la  base 


AND    THE    SECRET    DOCUMENTS 


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10 


THE   CASE   OF   BELGIUM 


the  basis  of  the  British  commissariat  from  the  French 
coast  to  Antwerp  as  soon  as  all  German  ships  were  swept 
off  the  North  Sea. 


d'approvisionnement    anglaise    de    la    cote    franchise    a 
. \nvers,  des  que  la  mer  du  Nord  serait  nettoyee  de  tous 


les  navires  de  guerre  allemands. 


"In  all  our  conversations  the  Colonel  regularly  in 
formed  me  about  the  secret  news  which  he  had  con 
cerning  the  military  circumstances  and  the  situation  of 
our  Eastern  neighbors,  etc.  At  the  same  time  he  em 
phasized  that  Belgium  was  under  the  imperative  neces 
sity  to  keep  herself  constantly  informed  of  the  hap 
penings  in  the  adjoining  Rhinelands.  I  had  to  admit 
that  with  us  the  surveillance-service  abroad  was,  in  times 
of  peace,  not  .directly  in  the  hands  of  the  General  Staff, 
as  our  Legations  had  no  Military  Attaches.  But  I  was 
careful  not  to  admit  that  I  did  not  know  whether  the 
espionage  service  which  is  prescribed  in  our  regulations, 
was  in  working  order  or  not.  But  I  consider  it  my 
duty  to  point  out  this  position  which  places  us  in  a  state 
of  evident  inferiority  to  our  neighbors,  our  presumable 
enemies. 

"Major-General,  Chief  of  the  General  Staff. 
(Initials  of  Gen.  Ducarme.) 


Dans  tous  nos  entretiens,  le  Colonel  me  communiqua 
regulitTement  les  renseignements  confidentiels  qu'il  pos- 
sodait  sur  1'etat  militaire  et  la  situation  de  nos  voisins  de 
1'Est,  etc.  En  meme  temps  il  insista  sur  la  necessite 
impcrieuse  pour  la  Belgique  de  se  tenir  au  courant  de  ce 
qui  se  passait  dans  les  pays  Rhenans  qui  nous  avoisinent. 
Je  dus  lui  confesser  que,  chez  nous,  le  service  de  sur 
veillance  au  dela  de  la  frontiere,  en  temps  de  paix,  ne 
releve  pas  directement  de  notre  etat-major;  nous  n'avons 
pas  d'attaches  militaires  aupres  de  nos  Legations.  Je  me 
gardai  bien,  cependant,  de  lui  avouer  que  j'ignorais  si  le 
service  d'espionage,  qui  est  present  par  nos  reglements. 
etait  ou  non  prepare.  Mais  il  est  de  mon  devoir  de 
signaler  ici  cette  situation  qui  nous  met  en  etat  d'in- 
feriorite  flagrante,  vis-a-vis  de  nos  voisins,  nos  ennemis 
eventuels. 

Le  General  major,  chef  des  Corps  d'Etat-Major. 
(Parafe  du  General  Ducarme.) 


"Note.  When  I  met  General  Grierson  at  Compiegne, 
during  the  manoeuvres  of  1906,  he  assured  me  the  result 
of  the  re-organization  of  the  English  army  would  be 
that  the  landing  of  150,000  would  be  assured  and,  that, 
moreover,  they  would  stand  ready  for  action  in  a  shorter 
time  than  has  been  assumed  above. 

"Concluded  September,  1906." 
(Initials  of  General  Ducarme.) 


Note.  Lorsque  je  rencontrai  le  General  Grierson  a  Com 
piegne,  pendant  les  manoeuvres  de  1906,  il  m'assura  que 
la  reorganisation  d  1'armee  anglaise  aurait  pour  resultat, 
non  seulement  d'assurer  le  debarquement  de  150,000 
hommes,  mais  de  permettre  leur  action  dans  un  delai  plus 
court  que  celui  dont  il  est  question  precedemment. 

Fini  septembre,  1906. 
(Parafe  du  General  Ducarme.) 


AND    THE    SECRET    DOCUMENTS 


11 


*i*i*}fftft<'4i  M* '*!£ ^n ** •'•*•••• 


THE   CASE   OF   BELGIUM 


DOCUMENT  NO.  2 

Minutes  of  a  Conference  Between  the  Belgian  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,   General   Jungbluth,   and 

the   British   Military  Attache,   Lieutenant-Colonel    Bridges 


(Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston,  British  Military 
Attache  in  Brussels,  was  succeeded  in  his  office  by  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Bridges.  Likewise,  General  Ducarme 
was  succeeded,  as  Chief  of  the  Belgian  Staff,  by  Gen 
eral  Jungbluth.  A  conversation  between  Colonel  Bridges 
and  General  Jungbluth  was  committed  to  writing,  and 
that  writing  was  also  found  at  the  Belgian  Foreign  Of 
fice.  The  document,  which  is  dated  April  23rd  and  is 
presumed  to  belong  to  the  year  1912,  is  marked  "confi- 
dentielle"  in  the  handwriting  of  Graf  v.d.  Straaten,  the 
Belgian  Foreign  Secretary.  This  is  the  translation:) 


"Confidential 

"The  British  Military  Attache  asked  to  see  General 
Jungbluth.  The  two  gentlemen  met  on  April  23rd. 

"Lieutenant-Colonel  Bridges  told  the  General  that  Eng 
land  had  at  her  disposal  an  army  which  could  be  sent  to 
the  Continent,  composed  of  six  divisions  of  infantry  and 
eight  brigades  of  cavalry — together  160,000  troops.  She 


has  also  everything  which  is  necessary  for  her  to  defend 
her  insular  territory.  Everything  is  ready. 

"At  the  time  of  the  recent  events,  the  British  Govern 
ment  would  have  immediately  effected  a  disembarkment 
in  Belgium  (chez  nous),  even  if  we  had  not  asked  for 
assistance. 

"The  General  objected  that  for  that  our  consent  was 
necessary. 

"The  Military  Attache  answered  th'at  he  knew  this, 
but  that — since  we  were  not  able  to  prevent  the  Ger 
mans  from  passing  through  our  country — England  would 
have  landed  her  troops  in  Belgium  under  all  circum 
stances  (en  tout  etat  de  cause). 

"As  for  the  place  of  landing,  the  Military  Attache  did 
not  make  a  precise  statement ;  he  said  that  the  coast  was 
rather  long,  but  the  General  knows  that  Mr.  Bridges, 
during  Easter,  has  paid  daily  visits  to  Zeebrugge  from 
Os'tende. 

"The  General  added  that  we  were,  besides,  perfectly 
able  to  prevent  the  Germans  from  passing  through." 


DOCUMENT  NO.  3 

Report  of  Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  in  Berlin,  to  the  Belgian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 


though  a  copy,  the  official  character  of  this  third  docu 
ment  found  in  Brussels  is  evident  from  the  official  im 
print  on  the  paper  on  which  the  copy  stands.  The  first 
page  reads:) 


(On  the  23rd  of  December,  1911,  Baron  Greindl,  then 
and  for  many  years  Belgian  Minister  in  Berlin,  made  a 
report  to  the  Belgian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
There  was  found  in  Brussels  a  copy  of  this  report;  al- 

SECTION 

No 

ENCLOSURE  COPY. 

Reply  to  No. 
General  Department 
Office  of 

Berlin,  December  23,  1911. 
Belgian  Legation, 
No.  3022—1626. 

Strictly  Confidential. 
What  is  Belgium  to  do  in  case  of  war  ? 

Mr.  Minister: 

I  have  had  the  honour  to  receive  the  dispatch  of  the  27  Novem 
ber    last,    P  without    docket-number,     registration   number   1108, 


AND    THE    SECRET    DOCUMENTS  13 

DOCUMENT  NO.  2 


L'Attache  lilitaire  anglais  a  demands  a  voir  le 
General  Jungbluth.Ces  Messieurs  se  sont  rencontres  le 
23  avril. 

Le  Lieutenant  Colonel  Bridges  a  dit  au  General 
que  1'Angleterre  disposait  d'une  armee  pouvant  etre  envoy- 
ee  sur  le  continent, composes  de  six  divisions  d'infanterB 
et  de  huit  brigades  de  cavalerie-en  tout  160.000  homraes. 
Elle  a  aussi  tout  ce  qu'il  lui  faut  pour  defendre  son  ten 
ritaire  insulaire. Tout  e 

Le  Gouvernement  britannique  ,lors  des  derniers 
eveneraents , aurai t  debarque  immediatement  chez  nous.meme 
si  nous  n'avions  pas  deraande  de  aecours. 

Le  General  a  objecte  qu'il  faudrait  pour  cela 
notre  consentement. 

L'Attache  militaire  a  repondu  qu'il  le  savait 
onais  que  comme  nous  n'etions  pas  a  meme  d'empecher  les 
Allemands  de  passer  chez  nous,  1 ' Angletarre  aurait  debarqae 
ses  troupes  en  Belgique  en  tout  etat  de  cause. 

Quant  au  lieu  de  debarquement, 1 'Attache  milita- 
re  n'a  pas  precisejil  a  dit  que  la  cote  etait  assez 
longue.mais  le  General  sait  que  M. Bridges  a  fait  ,d  'OsterrU. 
des  visites  journalieres  a  Zeebrugge  pendant  les  fgtes  de 
Paques. 

Vltx^a^t^  / 

Le  General  a  aj  oute  que  nous  etions^  parfaitegfet 
a  mSme  d'empgcher  les  Allemands  de  passer. 


14 


,THE    CASE   OF   BELGIUM 


SECTION 


DOCUMENT  NO.  3 


_  ..........  —  ......  ANNEXE 

Rgponse   au    N° 

t>on  G"..  .......  _____  ......  B«» 


rf  </  //-2r«4~^£c  -^f"/ 


Baron  Greindl's  report  is  an  extremely  long  one. 
Extracts  from  it  were  published  in  the  North  German 
Gazette  of  October  13th.  A  facsimile  has  been  made  of 
the  first  page  only  of  the  document,  because  of  its  great 
length. 

The  writer  reveals  with  great  astuteness  the  ulterior 
motives  underlying  the  English  proposal  and  draws  at 
tention  to  the  danger  of  the  situation  in  which  Belgium 
had  become  involved  by  a  one-sided  partisanship  in  favor 
of  the  Powers  of  the  Entente.  In  this  very  detailed  re 
port,  dated  Dec.  23,  1911,  Baron  Greindl  explains  that 
the  plan  of  the  General  Army  Staff  for  the  defense  of 
Belgian  neutrality  in  a  Franco-German  war  as  communi 
cated  to  him  only  concerned  the  question  as  to  what 
military  measures  should  be  adopted  in  case  Germany 
violated  Belgian  neutrality.  The  hypothesis  of  a  French 
attack  on  Germany  through  Belgium  had,  however,  just 
as  much  probability  in  itself.  The  diplomat  then  goes 
on  in  the  following  manner : 

"From  the  French  side  danger  threatens  not  only  in 
the  south  of  Luxemburg,  it  threatens  us  on  our  entire 


joint  frontier.     We  are  not  reduced  to  conjectures  for 
this  assertion.    We  have  positive  evidence  of  it. 

"Evidently  the  project  of  an  outflanking  movement 
from  the  north  forms  part  of  the  scheme  of  the  'Entente 
Cordiale.'  If  that  were  not  the  case,  then  the  plan  of 
fortifying  Flushing  would  not  have  called  forth  such  an 
outburst  in  Paris  and  London.  The  reason  why  they 
wished  that  the  Scheldt  should  remain  unfortified  was 
hardly  concealed  by  them.  Their  aim  was  to  be  able 
to  transport  an  English  garrison,  unhindered,  to  Ant 
werp,  which  means  to  establish  in  our  country  a  basis 
of  operation  for  an  offensive  in  the  direction  of  the 
Lower  Rhine  and  Westphalia,  and  then  to  make  us  throw 
our  lot  in  with  them,  which  would  not  be  difficult,  for, 
after  the  surrender  of  our  national  center  of  refuge,  we 
would,  through  our  own  fault,  renounce  every  possibility 
of  opposing  the  demands  of  our  doubtful  protectors  after 
having  been  so  unwise  as  to  permit  their  entrance  into 
our  country.  Colonel  Barnardiston's  announcements  at 
the  time  of  the  conclusion  of  the  'Entente  Cordiale; 
which  were  just  as  perfidious  as  they  were  naive,  have 


AND    THE    SECRET    DOCUMENTS 


15 


shown  us  plainly  the  true  meaning  of  things.  When  it 
became  evident  that  we  would  not  allow  ourselves  to  be 
frightened  by  the  pretended  danger  of  the  closing  of  the 
Scheldt,  the  plan  was  not  entirely  abandoned,  but  modi 
fied  in  so  far  as  the  British  army  was  not  to  land  on  the 
Belgian  coast,  but  at  the  nearest  French  harbors. 

"The  revelations  of  Captain  Faber,  which  were  denied 
as  little  as  the  newspaper  reports  by  which  they  were 
confirmed  or  completed  in  several  respects,  also  testify 
to  this.  This  British  army,  at  Calais  and  Dunkirk, 
would  by  no  means  march  along  our  frontier  to  Longway 
in  order  to  reach  Germany.  It  would  directly  invade 
Belgium  from  the  northwest.  That  would  give  it  the 
advantage  of  being  able  to  begin  operations  immediately, 


lo  encounter  the  Belgian  army  in  a  region  where  we 
could  not  depend  on  any  fortress,  in  case  we  wanted  to 
risk  a  battle.  Moreover,  that  would  make  it  possible 
for  it  to  occupy  provinces  rich  in  all  kinds  of  resources 
and,  at  any  rate,  to  prevent  our  mobilization  or  only  to 
permit  it  after  we  had  formally  pledged  ourselves  to 
carry  on  our  mobilization  to  the  exclusive  advantage  of 
Kngland  and  her  allies. 

"It  is  therefore  of  necessity  to  prepare  a  plan  of  battle 
for  the  Belgian  arlfty  also  for  that  possibility.  This  is 
necessary  in  the  interest  of  our  military  defense  as  well 
as  for  the  sake  of  the  direction  of  our  foreign  policy, 
in  case  of  war  between  Germany  and  France." 


COMMENT  ON  THE  DOCUMENTS 

By  the  North  German  Gazette 


The  British  Government  has  confined  its  answer  to 
our  revelations  from  the  archives  of  the  Belgian  Min 
istry  of  War,  concerning  the  Anglo-Belgian  military 
agreements  in  1906,  to  the  explanation  that  Major-Gen 
eral  Grierson,  who  took  part  in  their  formulation,  had 
died,  and  that  Colonel  Barnardiston  was  away  as  Chief 
of  the  English  troops  before  Kiaochow  and  that  it  might 
be  that  an  academic  discussion  had  taken  place  between 
those  two  British  Officers  and  the  Belgian  Military  Au 
thorities  as  to  the  assistance  which  the  British  army 
would  be  able  to  give  to  Belgium  in  case  her  neutrality 
were  violated  by  one  of  her  neighbors. 

The  Belgian  Government  has  remarked  that  it  could 
only  be  considered  as  natural  that  the  English  Military 
Attache  in  Brussels  should  during  the  Algeciras  crisis 
have  asked  the  Chief  of  the  Belgian  General  Staff  about 
the  measures  which  were  to  prevent  the  violation  of  Bel 
gian  neutrality  guaranteed  by  England.  The  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff,  General  Ducarme,  had  answered,  that 
Belgium  would  be  capable  of  warding  off  an  attack  no 
matter  from  which  side  it  might  come.  The  Belgian 
Government  adds  to  this  the  following  remark:  "Did 
the  conversation  exceed  these  limits,  and  did  Colonel 
Barnardiston  explain  the  war  plan  which  the  British 
General  Staff  wished  to  follow  in  case  this  neutrality 
should  be  violated?  We  doubt  it."  Demanding  the  un 
abridged  publication  of  the  material  found  in  the  Bel 
gian  secret  archives,  the  Belgian  Government  makes  the 


solemn  assertion  that  it  was  never  asked  directly  or  in 
directly  to  take  sides  with  the  Triple  Entente  in  case 
of  a  Franco-German  war. 

As  may  be  seen  from  these  declarations,  the  British 
Government  from  the  beginning  has  failed  to  dispute 
the  statements  of  the  Imperial  Government.  It  has 
limited  itself  to  minimizing  them.  It  perhaps  told  itself 
that,  owing  to  the  overwhelming  abundance  of  evidence, 
a  denial  of  the  facts  would  be  useless  and  risky.  The 
unveiling,  in  the  meantime,  of  an  Anglo-Belgian  military 
news  service  and  the  discovery  of  Belgian  war  maps 
prepared  by  the  British  Authorities  prove  anew  how  far 
the  preparations  for  the  Anglo-Belgian  war  plan  against 
Germany  had  proceeded. 


Here  it  is  plainly  stated  that  the  British  Government 
had  the  intention,  in  case  of  a  Franco-German  war,  to 
soid  troops  to  Belgium  immediately,  that  is  to  sa\,  to 
riolate  Belgian  neutrality  and  do  the  very  thing  which 
England  at  tlic  time  when  Germany,  justified  by  reasons 
of  self-protection,  anticipated  her,  used  as  a  pretext  for 
declaring  war  on  Germany.  Moreover,  the  Britisli  Gov 
ernment,  with  a  cynicism  that  is  unparalleled  in  history, 
has  taken  advantage  of  Germany's  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality  for  the  purpose  of  raising  sentiment  against 
us  all  over  the  world  and  of  posing  as  the  protector  of 
the  small  and  feeble  pozvers. 

As  regards  the  Belgian  Government,  it  was  its  duty 


16 


THE   CASE   OF   BELGIUM 


not  only  to  reject  most  emphatically  the  English  insinu 
ations,  but  also  to  point  out  to  the  other  signatories  of 
the  London  Protocol  of  1839  and  especially  to  the  Ger 
man  Government  that  England  had  repeatedly  tempted 
Belgium  to  disregard  the  duties  incumbent  upon  her  as 
a  neutral  Power.  The  Belgian  Government,  however, 
did  not  do  so.  That  Government  considered  itself  jus 
tified  and  bound  to  take,  in  agreement  with  the  English 
General  Staff,  military  precautions  against  the  supposed 
plan  of  a  German  invasion  of  Belgium.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Belgian  Government  has  never  made  the 
slightest  attempt  to  take,  in  agreement  with  the  German 
Government  or  the  military  authorities  of  Germany,  de 
fensive  measures  against  the  possibility  of  an  Anglo- 
French  invasion  of  Belgium.  Yet  the  documentary  evi 
dence  which  has  been  found,  proves  that  Belgium  was 
fully  informed  that  such  an  invasion  was  in  the  inten 
tions  of  the  two  Entente  Powers.  This  shoivs  that  the 
Belgian  Government  was  determined  from  the  outset  to 
join  Germany's  enemies  and  make  common  cause  with 
them. 


The   above    exposition    convincingly    proves   the    fact 


that  the  same  England  which  is  now  posing  as  the  pro 
tector  of  Belgian  neutrality  forced  Belgium  to  a  one 
sided  partisanship  in  favor  of  the  Powers  of  the  Entente, 
and  that  she  at  one  time  even  thought  of  a  violation  of 
the  neutrality  of  ^Holland.  It  is,  furthermore,  clear  that 
the  Belgian  Government,  by  lending  an  ear  to  the  Eng 
lish  whisperings,  is  guilty  of  a  severe  violation  of  the 
duties  incumbent  upon  it  as  a  neutral  power.  The  right 
fulfillment  of  these  duties  would  have  compelled  the 
Belgian  Government  to  foresee  in  her  plans  for  defense 
the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  by  France  and  to  con 
clude  with  Germany  agreements  analogous  to  those  con 
cluded  with  France  and,  for  this  eventuality,  England. 
The  discovered  official  papers  constitute  a  documentary 
proof  of  the  fact,  well  known  to  competent  German  au 
thorities  long  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  that  Bel 
gium  connived  with  the  Powers  of  the  Entente.  They 
serve  as  a  justification  for  our  military  procedure  and 
as  a  confirmation  of  the  information  obtained  by  the 
German  military  authorities  about  France's  intentions. 
They  may  open  the  eyes  of  the  Belgian  people  with  re 
gard  to  the  question  to  whom  it  is  they  owe  the  catas 
trophe  which  has  swept  over  the  unfortunate  country. 


THE  INTERNATIONAL  MONTHLY.  INC. 

1123  BROADWAY 

NEW  YORK 


JAHLLB6?— 


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